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China and the International Aid System:  
Challenges and Opportunities 
  
 
Paul Opoku-Mensah 
 
Introduction 
A recent increase in Chinese activity within development aid, as in many areas 
of the international system, is raising increasing concerns especially from the 
West about China’s role and impact in this international system of power and 
development. From a purely technical appraisal by a bureaucrat within the aid 
system, China’s aid activity has systemic ramifications: Here comes a very large 
new player on the block that has the potential of changing the landscape of 
overseas development assistance.1. From a critical politico-moral-ideological 
standpoint, the view is less sanguine: China is effectively pricing responsible 
and well-meaning aid organizations out of the market in the very places where 
they are needed most. If they continue to succeed in pushing their alternative 
development model, they will succeed in underwriting a world that is more 
corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian2.   From official China, however, the noise 
about Chinese aid is much ado about nothing: China is attracting external 
capital, and as a balance China wants to help developing countries by financing 
infrastructure projects. Helping your neighbours’ to have a good life is no sin3.  
 
These three authors no doubt bring three different and relevant perspectives to 
Chinese aid activity. What is common to all these three, however, is the 
recognition that while in the recent past aid politics was discussed without 
reference to China, current discussions cannot ignore China. Indeed any analysis 
that seeks to provide understanding of aid, necessarily, has to integrate the role 
of China and its impact on this international system of power relations as well as 
the system’s underlying structures of ideologies, norms and values.  
 
This is the objective of this chapter. It seeks to understand China’s involvement 
as an actor in the aid system, and its implications f r restructuring the nature of 
                                                      
1  Tom Crouch, Country director for the Philippines at the Asian Development Bank (cited 
in Perlez, Jane 2006).  
2  Moisés Naím, editor in chief of Foreign Policy (cited in Naim, 2007:2). 
3  Liqun Jin, vice president of the Asian Development Bank and a former vice minister of 
finance in Beijing (cited in Perlez, Jane 2006). 
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the aid system itself. Is China fundamentally redefining the nature of the aid 
system in ways that effectively price out other players, and challenge the 
normative principles underlying the system? Or is it imply an actor helping 
poor neighbours with no systemic ramifications on the aid system?  This chapter 
provides answers to these questions. Specifically, through using the case of 
Chinese aid to Africa, it seeks to understand and assess the nature of Chinese 
aid, and its effect --- if any --- on the international aid system. The chapter is 
structured as follows: this introduction is followed by a discussion on the 
international aid system and its role in the international system of power 
relations in general and African development in particular. This is followed by a 
discussion on the Chinese aid system with an emphasis on its history, 
characteristics, and influence in African development. Following this empirical 
analysis, the next section compares the dominant aid system with that of the 
Chinese. Following this comparison, the final section brings the discussions 
together in an assessment of China’s impact on the nature of the aid. The 
objective is to assess if China is radically transforming the aid system, or rather 
been integrated into this international system of power relations. 
The Aid System: An International System of Power relations 
The international development aid system remains, undo btedly, the most 
powerful and enduring structural force influencing development worldwide. 
Established after WWII to facilitate the development of the poor countries of the 
“South,” it has become a distinct, very powerful and new type of international 
system, reflecting global power relations, and continuously developing and 
framing regional, national and local subsystems and organizational landscapes 
all over the world. As a system, it is premised on b th accelerating and directing 
a country’s development through the transfer of, mainly concessional resources. 
Disbursing billions of dollars, and with immense con eptual and institutional 
power, it shapes institutions and policies across the world.   
 
It is a system that comprises donor and receiver nations. The donor side includes 
most of the advanced countries of the OECD. On the recipient side over 160 
countries around the world received aid in 2001. The bulk of this aid was 
concentrated on the poorest countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, but with a 
substantial contribution also to middle-income countries, especially in Central 
and Eastern Europe (Fowler 2000). As was indicated in the previous chapter, 
what primarily produces and reproduces this system and defines its borders vis-
à-vis the rest of the world and the rest of the organizational landscape is the flow 
and transfer of funds, and the character of this reource transfer. Thus, 
understanding this resource transfer becomes a prerequisite to gauging the 
power relations, and indeed the overall impact of the system on its various actors 
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(Tvedt, 2002). The primary sources of international assistance are from official 
aid—and from private donations and investment income—i.e. private aid. In 
1998, $47.9 billion of tax funds were allocated as official overseas development 
assistance (ODA) (World Bank, 1999: 68). The major institutions providing 
official aid can be divided between bilateral donors—that is the specialized 
development agencies of Northern countries, and the multilateral agencies of the 
United Nations system. In 1997, 70 per cent of official aid was allocated 
bilaterally, the remainder through multilateral channels. By and large, the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) within this system—the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group and its sister regional 
development banks—provide loans for financial stabilizat on and reform as well 
as for development investment. United Nations agencies typically employ grant 
funding. The private aid system (of foundations, charities and international 
NGOs) also works on a grant basis (Fowler, 2000). The resource transfers, 
however goes both ways.   For instance, over the period 1985-1992, developing 
countries transferred more in repayments and interest than they received from 
the North. During these years, the average annual flow of resources from South 
to North was US$44.39 billion. The figure became positive again in 1993 with a 
net flow to the South of US$11.4 billion (Microsoft Encarta, 2002). 
 
It is a hierarchical system, even if the rhetoric sometimes is to the contrary, with 
donors at the helm because of their financial resources, conceptual dominance, 
and the unequal distribution of sanctionary instruments (Tvedt, 1998: 224; 
Fowler, 2000). The system is made up of sub-systems at all levels, each with its 
own history, logic and internal dynamics. In most countries, the system is 
relatively autonomous and insulated with its own developments, norm systems 
and value orientations (Tvedt, 1998:62).  Nonetheless all these subsystems form 
one part of a bigger multinational, together with and mingling with other 
subsystems where donor states are at the core of the system. There is always a 
dominant discourse, appropriated by the major actors: donors, recipient states 
and NGOs. This powerful development discourse may ch nge over time, but for 
the period it dominates, it shapes the policy respon es of the actors in the system 
(Tvedt, 2002). The actors in this system are structu ally integrated primarily via 
resource transfers and communication-exchange. These actors - public and 
private donors, recipient governments, international NGOs, local NGOs - can be 
conceptualized as a river and its “feeders”. A river system consists of both 
channels (rivers) and reservoirs. The system can be seen as consisting of 
different subsystems, or different tributaries or deltaic streams. The point with 
the river system analogy is that this social system consists of both  recipient 
governments and NGOs as diversion channels and the onor-offices and funding 
sources as reservoirs.  
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It is a system that encourages and institutionalizes different forms of social 
integration, but despite the use of the word integration there is no assumption 
that the relationships so described are harmonious. The terms social integration 
and system integration as used here embrace both order and conflict.4 Indeed it 
has evolved into an international regime, with a set of norms, principles, and 
procedures that have been designed to defend certain conomic and ideological 
interests and to promote international stability (van de Walle, 2001). 
The influence of the aid system is structured around fi ancial transfers, 
institutional arrangements, and policy frameworks. The 1990s in particular saw 
the particular influence of the aid system through the imposition of policy 
instruments like the SAPS, ERPs. The nature of interventions has also 
undergone change with a focus on process. Thus processes like the PRSPs 
become central the aid effectiveness debate, and the use of non-state channels. 
An understanding of these different channels becomes important to 
understanding the nature of international aid system, and the nature of power in 
the system. The influence of the aid system on Africa is near absolute, as it 
remains a very powerful and enduring structural force impacting institutional 
and policy development in African countries. In many African countries it 
finances the bulk of development interventions, shapes institutional 
arrangements, frames policy alternatives, as well as provides mediating 
structure(s) for societal processes. In other countries he aid system’s influence 
is more marginal. Nevertheless; its concepts, institutions, administrative 
arrangements and fiscal resources help shape the most critical aspects of 
development and politics on the African continent.   
Chinese Aid to Africa: Continuities and Discontinuities 
As a rising actor, the Chinese Aid system lacks the institutionalized and well 
developed support services made up of the numerous aid research institutions, 
evaluation departments of official aid agencies, and the entire consultancy 
industry that has developed around the Western aid system (Lancaster, 2007). 
                                                      
4  In a further elaboration, Tvedt (1998) argues that in the literature on social integration and 
system integration it is often noted how conflict theorists emphasize the conflict between 
groups of actors as the motor of social change, while normative functionalists downplay 
the role of actors and seek to emphasize the (functional or dysfunctional) relationships 
between the institutions of society. Neither approach is of course adequate, precisely 
because each deals with only one side of the agency versus structure problem. The task 
should be to overcome this dualism, but the micro versus macro distinction cannot be 
overcome by regarding social integration as something which should only refer to 
situations where actors are physically co-present and system integration to where they are 
not. This is unsatisfactory because face-to-face int ractions are not confined to micro-
processes, and macro-processes may be organised as face-to-face interactions.  
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Consequently, not as much information and/or knowledge is known about the 
Chinese aid system. Yet an outline of the system is gradually emerging, which a 
study of Chinese aid to Africa helps unravel.   
 
A study of Chinese aid to Africa indicates, first, that Chinese aid is not new.  
Indeed Chinese aid to African countries was founded, in part, on a logic and 
motivation articulated in the 1950s by Mao Zedong that although China is a 
poor nation, it should take the responsibility of helping those in need, those 
smaller and powerless nations (Hu, 2003). Africa was identified by Mao as the 
key part of the “Third World” revolutionary forces in his famous “Three World 
Theory”5. But beyond helping poor Africa countries, Chinese aid also had other 
motivations, including neutralising assistance from rival countries, which were 
being helped by Taiwan. In the 1960's and 70’s, for example, China aided 
Angola while Taiwan helped neighboring South Africa (Perlez, 2006). The 
modalities of Chinese aid, more so, include grants, investment/tied aid, 
concessional loans, and government guarantees for investment. 
 
The historiography of Chinese aid to Africa can be disaggregated into three 
distinct phases, stretching from the late 1940s to the present era. The first phase, 
dating from the late 1940s to the end of the 1970s, wa  characterised by the use 
of aid as a moral, ideological, and foreign policy tool with aid being used by 
China to support other socialist countries and liberation movements. Beyond 
this, it also had a strategic purpose aimed at countering the Society Union’s 
influence in Africa, as well as promoting its one China policy through granting 
aid only to those African states that refused to recognise an independent and 
sovereign Taiwan. Practically the relations with Africa were through a two-
pronged strategy of courting the newly independent African countries, while 
encouraging and supporting the liberation struggles of those still under colonial 
rule. A landmark event in the evolution of Chinese aid occurred in 1964 during 
the then Premier Zhou en Lai’s visit to Mali and Ghana where he launched what 
has become known as “China’s Eight Principles of Economic and Technical 
Aid” These eight principles fully give expression to he desire of China to 
conduct economic and cultural cooperation with the newly-emerged countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America (China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000).6 
                                                      
5  Mao’s Three World Theory of international relations divides the world into three political 
and economic blocs: the US and the Soviet Union belong to the First World; the middle 
elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia, and Canada, belong to the Second World; 
China and the vast majority of developing countries b long to the Third World. 
6  The eight principles are: 
a. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the princi le of equality and mutual 
benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of 
unilateral alm [sic] but as something mutual. 
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By the end of 1965, 17 of the 38 African states had recognised China (compared 
to fourteen who continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan), and linkages had 
been established with at least a dozen African liberation movements. However, 
with the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 the direction of China’s 
policy and behaviour changed. Similar to its foreign policy globally, China’s 
relations with Africa were curtailed. But even though operational activities were 
reduced and relations even suspended or terminated in a few instances, relations 
were intensified with select African states such as e.g. Congo (Brazzaville), 
Tanzania and Zambia (Yu, 1988). From 1975-1978 Chinese aid projects in 
Africa were seen in the light industry, agriculture, h alth and transport where the 
latter was especially seen in the construction of the TAZARA7 Railway. The 
railroad was a key project financed and executed by China. Construction was 
started in 1970 and operation commenced six years later. At that time, it was the 
largest foreign-aid project ever undertaken by China. It was built to serve the 
landlocked Zambia as an alternative to rail lines via Rhodesia and South Africa. 
The Chinese government sponsored the construction of the railway specifically 
to eliminate Zambia’s economic dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa 
(Robinson and Shambaugh, 1994).  
 
The second phase of China’s aid to Africa, the First decade under Deng 
Xiaoping (1978-1989), was marked by the end of ideology, the start of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
b. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the 
sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for 
any privileges.  
 
c. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and 
extends the time limit for repayment when necessary o as to lighten the burden of the 
recipient countries as far as possible.  
d. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to 
make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step 
on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development.  
e. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects 
which require less investment while yielding quicker r sults, so that the recipient 
governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.  
f. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own 
manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by 
the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the 
Chinese Government undertakes to replace them. 
g. In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the 
personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.  
h. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will 
have the same standard of living as the experts of he recipient country. The Chinese 
experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities 
(China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).  
7  Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority. 
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economic pragmatism, and declining aid to Africa. This was a period marked by 
the end of the ideological framework that had characterised the first, and the 
start of economic pragmatism. While the conception and rhetoric generally did 
not change, this phase nonetheless was characterised by a reduction in Chinese 
aid due to changing relations with Moscow and Washington, and an internal 
reorganization of the Chinese economy which was also iling. Focus was now 
on mutual benefits and economic sustainability. By 1988, only thirteen African 
countries received Chinese aid, while trade relations increased. For example, 
between 1976 and 1980, Chinese exports to Nigeria rose from $128 million to 
$378 million; and overall trade with Africa rose by 70% in this period. Aid 
pledges fell, although China’s aid commitments of $258.9m in 1984 still made it 
Africa’s sixth largest donor 
 
The current and third phase, the post-Tiananmen Square era (from 1989), is 
marked by unparalleled institutionalized relations, with the establishment of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, and the development of 
a China Africa Policy8 in 2006. In general this phase is characterised by a twin 
process of increasing the volume of Aid, as well as institutionalising the aid 
relations between China and Africa. Conceptually aid to Africa was still 
discussed in terms of south-South cooperation, rathe  an the North-South 
conception that defines traditional aid between the West and Africa. As will be 
shown later, this has implications for understating he nature of the relations, and 
China’s potential impact in the aid system. This period also marked a period of 
renewed interest in Africa with an increase in aid from US $60 million in 1988 
to US $375 million in 1990. An expansion of collaboration was necessary due to 
China’s demand for resources, markets and investment possibilities, and these 
circumstances led to the establishment of the China-Africa Forum in order to 
have a means to increase political power by providing an alternative to the 
orthodox development route for African governments. China’s Africa Policy of 
2006 and the development of the Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009 show that 
China’s interest in Africa is increasing. In the context of this institutionalization 
of the relations, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, speaking at FOCAC committed 
China to the following:   
 
• Double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009 
• Provide US$3 billion of preferential loans and US$2 billion of preferential 
buyer’s credits to Africa in the next three years 
• Set up a China–Africa development fund, which would reach US$5 billion, 
to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to 
them 
                                                      
8  The full text is available at http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-01/12/content_156490.htm. 
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• Cancel debt in the form of all the interest-free government loans that 
matured at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily indebted poor countries 
and the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic relations 
with China 
• Increase from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China 
receiving zero-tariff treatment from the least develop d countries in Africa 
with diplomatic ties with China. 
• Establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in 
the next three years 
• Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 
senior agricultural experts to Africa; set up 10 special agricultural 
technology demonstration centers in Africa; build 30 hospitals in Africa 
and provide a grant of RMB 300 million for providing artemisinin2 and 
build 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers to fight malaria in 
Africa; dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in 
Africa; and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to 
African students from the current 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year by 2009 
(Manji, 2007:2). 
 
The extent to which the list of commitments has been met, the motivations for 
China’s commitment --- whether indeed Chinese aid is good or detrimental to 
overall African development --- are still debated. In the midst of these debates, 
the fact still remains that these commitments per se epresent a new phase of 
China’s relations with Africa --- an era of instituonalized and enlarged Chinese 
aid engagement in Africa.   
 
 Besides the general historiography, the second aspect of Chinese aid vis-à-vis 
the dominant Western model of aid relates to conception, delivery and relational 
aspects of Chinese aid---that is, the praxis of aid. In deed Chinese aid to Africa, 
and elsewhere, is not important only in terms of its volume and historical 
development. To the contrary, its importance is gauged when its aid praxis is 
compared to the praxis of the Western aid system. The first such difference is 
the conception for aid. Conceptually, China’s aid is framed in terms of a 
developing country helping another developing country, hus negating the 
conceptual order of the aid system as a system of relations between the 
developed North and the undeveloped South. This has sub tantive as well as 
symbolic implications, as will be discussed later.  In addition, Chinese aid is 
conceived as a two way process, defined in terms of mutual benefit to China and 
aid recipient countries. Indeed it is official Chinese policy to disburse aid in 
ways that benefits China economically, i.e. tied aid in kind, technical assistance 
and infrastructure construction for initiatives that f vour Chinese investment. 
Thus, a very important dimension of Chinese aid as it relates to the economic 
pragmatism of the post-Deng years, is the rhetoric f a “win-win” economic 
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cooperation and trade relations, rather than poverty reduction. This is a 
departure from the traditional aid which is conceived in terms of the giver 
helping the recipient, even if the rhetoric is not always borne out in practice.   
 
But perhaps one of the most important differences relates to the channel of aid 
delivery. Traditional Western aid relies on various channels including 
multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, UN agencies, EU Aid); bilateral 
channels (Danida, USAID; CIDA, NORAD etc); private organizations (NGOs, 
PVOs, CSOs). Indeed for Western aid the NGO channel, in particular, became a 
very important channel in the 1980s, a period referd to as the “NGO Decade” 
in development discourse because of the importance NGOs assumed in 
development. The delivery of Chinese aid, on the other hand, relies exclusively 
on bilateral state channels. To the extent that non-state actors are involved, they 
are normally private companies used in the implementation of infrastructural 
projects. Chinese aid is thus delivered through private-sector or state-owned 
enterprises. Thus the NGO channel in aid that was established since the 1980s, 
and has become important to Western aid, plays no role in the implementation of 
Chinese aid. Absent, too, are the other multiplicity of supporting actors and 
institutions that service, and are part of traditional Western aid. This includes the 
consultancy firms, the development institutes, and the ‘development diplomats’ 
that are essential parts of traditional aid. For insta ce in a comparison to World 
Bank practice, Jane Perlez argues that China’s aid rarely include the extra 
freight of expensive consultants, provisions that are common to World Bank 
projects (Perlez 2006: para. 8). 
 
There are other remaining areas, such as the intersection of aid and migration, 
aid and trade, in which the Chinese aid model differs from its Western 
counterpart (Sautman, 2006).   
Restructuring Power relations in the Aid System 
This examination of Chinese aid in Africa certainly shows that in a Western-led 
system dominated by North-South relations and powerful countries, China is 
now a visible actor. And in the case of Africa, this engagement is becoming 
important to the continent’s development, particularly in the areas of 
infrastructure development (Prah, 2007; Manji and Marks, 2007; Kaplinsky et 
al, 2007).  But is this visibility indicative of fundamental change in the structural 
relations of power and the rules of game in the aid system? In other words is 
China restructuring power in the aid system, or has it become a new actor with a 
different modus operandi but who will gradually be incorporated into the 
system. Put differently, will China be a transforme or rather be caught by the 
isomorphism that has characterised the aid system? 
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To answer the question, a recap of how power is structu ed and influenced in the 
aid system. At the time of its establishment in theyears immediately after 
WWII, the aid system reflected the state of power relations in the global system. 
At the head of the system was the United States --- albeit challenged by the 
USSR --- followed by the colonial powers. Besides this fact that the 
establishment of the aid system reflected and institutionalized a system of power 
relations, as a system, it has its modes of exercising influence. Concretely the 
aid system exercises power through its financial transfers, institutional 
dominance, conceptual dominance, and sanctionary instruments. An assessment 
of China’s role in the system does have to take cognizance of this reality. 
 
First, although China is not the dominant power in the international system, its 
place in the hierarchy has changed substantively. Irrespective of the standard of 
measurement, and areas of influence, the power of China is increasingly visible 
in the international hierarchy of power. This is more so reflected, particularly, in 
the global economic system. Within the aid system itself, the size and volume of 
Chinese aid, and the expectations that this will increase, is a major indicator that 
financially the power of the actors in the aid system has changed. For instance in 
terms of volume, in the course of the past 50 years China has given 44.4 billion 
in aid to African countries. Since 2000, China has cancelled more than 
US$10bilion debt owed it by 31 African countries, and established a US$ 5.5 
billion fund to support African development.  Beyond the volume, however, the 
overall implications of   Chinese aid in Africa can be gauged when it is 
compared to Western aid. In 2005, for instance, Chinese loans to three African 
countries: Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique was US$8.0 billion, exceeding total 
World Bank loans to the whole of Africa, which was US$2.3 billion.  Similarly, 
in 2006 the amount of Chinese aid in the form of loans to Africa was thrice the 
total sum of loans given by all OECD member countries to African countries 
during the same period; and 25 times of the aid from the American Import and 
Export Bank (Xiaoyun, Li 2008; Lyakurwa, 2008).   
 
Chinese aid is also distinguished by its practical focus, and direct impact:  As 
William Lyakurwa, the Executive Director of the African Economic Research 
Consortium based in Nairobi, Kenya puts it:  
 
Initially, Beijing’s aid was concentrated on national stadiums and ‘People’s 
Palaces’. This has given way to a more practical focus: constructing roads, 
dams and government buildings; upgrading power distribution systems; 
installing methane generating plants; and so on. The sending of medical teams 
and agricultural specialists continues to be a mainst y of Chinese assistance to 
Africa. Chinese foreign aid has tended to concentrate on these basic 
infrastructures and education, areas where Western donors have cut back 
substantially (Lyakurwa, 2008:17).  
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Similarly Sautman argues that while China’s aid to Africa is not entirely untied, 
it is distinct from Western aid in a key way:   
 
Chinese aid is often dispensed in such a way that corrupt rulers cannot 
somehow use it to buy Mercedes Benzes . . . [It] is often in the form of 
infrastructure, such as a railroad network in Nigeria or roads in Kenya and 
Rwanda. Or in the form of doctors and nurses to provide health care to people 
who otherwise would not have access . . . . In addition, China provides 
scholarships for African students to study in its universities and, increasingly, 
funds to encourage its businessmen to invest in Africa (Sautman, 2007: 27).  
 
The overall effect of this  approach is captured by Sierra Leone’s ambassador to 
China who argues that while Chinese aid leads to visible results and impact in 
Africa, “the G-8  countries are putting in huge sum of money and they don’t see 
very much” (ibid). Some of these results include newly constructed roads in 
Ethiopia, the renovation of the railway system in Nigeria, and the construction 
of a US$562 million hydro electric power plant at Bui in Ghana.  
 
It needs to be emphasized that it is not the volume of Chinese aid resources per 
se that makes China an important actor in the aid system. Rather it is the fact 
that its resources is increasingly pricing out actors who a decade ago were 
undisputable leaders in the field. And this aid hadbecome an important tool in 
African development, itself reflected by the ease with which China is able to 
routinely convene meetings of African leaders. To be sure, this does not mean 
that China has rendered the traditional actors irrelevant and powerless, as it has 
not. What is stressed therefore is the fact that within the past decade China is 
increasingly becoming important in an international policy area where it was an 
insignificant player just two decades ago.   
But the power of the aid system does not reside, sol ly, in its financial resources. 
Indeed the aid system remains the major arena within w ich the dominant ideas 
in development are developed, implemented and contested (Abrahamsen, 2000; 
Tvedt, 2006; Opoku-Mensah, 2007; 2009; Opoku-Mensah, Lewis and Tvedt, 
2007). This is an acknowledgment that politically, the powerful actors in the aid 
system --- the World Bank, the UN, the major donor states and the biggest and 
most influential development NGOs-- dominate the development and 
implementation of the most influential ideas and strategies of development. As 
Abrahamsen argues, the aid system and its most powerful institutional actors:  
 
.... constantly update and refine knowledge about how best to achieve 
development, and it is also through these myriad organizations that the 
decrees of development filter down from the various expert offices to the 
local settings in Africa, Asia and Latin America.  (Abrahamsen, 2000: 20-21. 
See also Tvedt, 2006; Wallace et al., 2006)  
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From this persepctive,  both the  World Bank (Washington Consesus) and the 
UNDP (the New York Dissent) are part of the same aid system within which the 
dominant ideas in development are created, adopted, negated, distorted and/or 
implemented, and where different actors compete for hegemonic control over 
development ideas and practices. The conceptual power f the aid system to 
define what is good and bad development, and to impose these definitions on 
recipient countries, has been perhaps the most effective and vexatious exercise 
of the power of aid actors, as it affects the sovereignty of aid recipients. In the 
case of Africa some commentators argue that this def nitional power of the aid 
system has had the most far reaching impact on the continent, as unlike other aid 
practices, they seek to shape the development routeitself (Kankwenda, 2004).  
 
The entry of China into the aid system is changing this power of the traditional 
aid system to shape the development route, as it offers a new set of ideas and 
practices that, first, is breaking the monopoly of Western aid to define, and 
second, is also proving attractive to aid recipient countries, particularly in 
Africa. These new set of ideas and practices, subsumed under what is 
increasingly called the “Beijing Consensus” (Ramo, C J, 2004; Xing, 2007), 
departs in some substantive ways from the aid system’  consensus on policy and 
practice. While the Beijing consensus, and China in ge eral, is no where near 
replacing the institutions of the aid system as the dominant developers of 
development ideas, some of these practices---including the right to self 
determination by states, non interference in domestic political and governance 
issues, the leadership role of the state in development---challenges the prevailing 
development orthodoxy of the past two decades.  But more important, the 
Beijing consensus gives to aid recipients to exercis  choice in what the past 
decade has been an array of conditionalities, including vexatious political ones. 
The issue is not that Chinese aid does not involve conditionality. It does as it is 
official Chinese policy to disburse aid in ways that benefits China economically, 
i.e. tied aid in kind, technical assistance and infrastructure construction for 
initiatives that favour Chinese investment. What is different, however, is that 
these conditionalities do not relate to the touchy issue of sovereignty that has 
been at the heart of the criticisms levelled at tradi ional Western aid by a number 
of African countries (Kankwenda, 2004).     
 
But perhaps the most important effect of Chinese aid relates to the opportunity it 
gives aid recipients, particularly African countries, to rethink their relations with 
Western aid actors who have exercised substantive power in African 
development. Thus for instance, in a recent interview, the Senegalese President 
Abdoulaye Wade argues that the continent can ignore Eu ope and look to China 
for its needs, as China offers Africa the same thing that Europe has been 
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offering at a better price with excellent conditions.9 And this ‘better conditions’ 
include the absence of intrusive conditionalities often associated with Western 
aid. As a number of analysts argue, China’s aid to Africa, while not 
disinterested, is not used as a political tool in the same way as aid from Western 
political actors in Africa. Indeed, in contrast to most other donors (especially the 
United States and the United Kingdom, with France much less so), China does 
not impose political and economic conditionality requirements. This makes the 
country an attractive source of aid, especially when, as in Angola and 
Zimbabwe, the international financial institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank are trying to alter the behaviours of 
governments by imposing political conditions (Lyakurwa, William, 2008:17. 
See also Sautman, 2007; Prah, 2008). Perhaps this is best captured by Julius 
Nyerere, Tanzania’s first leader, in a comment on   China’s grant for building 
the Tanzania-Zambia railways (Tazara): 
 
The Chinese people have not asked us to become communists in order to 
qualify for this loan . . . they have never at any point suggested that we should 
change any of our policies – internal or external” (Nyerere, 1974: 235). 
 
To be sure, this in itself does not indicate a permanent restructuring of power 
relations in aid.  But it does indicate that change is certainly in the making in the 
international aid system of power relations.   
Conclusion 
Exactly a decade ago, in a seminal and provocative rticle in Foreign Affairs 
titled “Does China Matter?” Gerald Segal argued that e purported influence of 
China is often greatly exaggerated, indeed the effect of a carefully managed 
theatrical performance by China itself.  The Chinese involvement in aid is 
certainly not a theatrical performance, but one that poses a challenge to the 
existing international system in fundamental, unexplored, and unknown ways.  
 
Will China’s engagement lead to long-term and permanent realignment of power 
relations in the aid system? Or in line with the institutional isomorphism that has 
characterised the aid system in the past, will China ultimately be co-opted into 
the established practise and consensus in the aid system? Put differently, are we 
                                                      
9  It is available at http://blog.taragana.com/n/afric -looking-towards-india-china-senegal-
president-91009/ 
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going to witness a sinization of the aid system, or simply the inclusion of an 
actors, even this actor sometimes operates differetenly? 
 
Like most things about China’s recent rise, definitive conclusions do not exist, 
as we are still in the midst of the process we seek to assess. Yet contradictory 
tendencies can be observed.  On the one hand, and as has already been argued, 
China’s presence in the aid system has already changed the system. The aid 
system and its operations cannot be adequately understood outside an analytical 
integration of the activities of China in this system. But similarly, Chinese aid is 
also already undergoing change as it interacts with the already established 
Western aid system (Guérin,  2008).   
 
In the final analyses, however, perhaps the most critical question should not be 
the extent to which China has changed the system, or is itself changed by the aid 
system. Indeed the debate should not be framed as a zero-sum game. Rather the 
focus should be on the implications of China’s entry on the purpose of the aid 
system: to assist the development of the developing countries. Perhaps the 
question ought to be rephrased in terms of the implications of China’s recent 
involvement in the aid system for the purpose of aid. Concretely, the entry of 
China into the aid system, and the challenge it poses to the Westen aid project, 
should be used as an entry point to reconstitute power in the system on behalf of 
those who, traditionally, have been dictated to. Perhaps it offers the opportunity 
to rationally rethink, and address the pathologies that have characterised the 
operandi of the Western aid system, including the sometimes paternalistic 
intrusion into the affairs of aid recipient countries, the imposition of one-size-
fits-all development models, and the lack of effectiveness. If China’s 
engagement in the aid system can achieve this, it would have played a far 
greater role in restructuring the system than in simply changing the power 
relations in her interests.  
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